Jean-Jacques Rousseau, writing in mid-18th century Geneva, discusses in The Social Contract several types of government and societies that depend on them, scorning and praising elements of each. Overall, he seems rather cynical about the possibilities of a decent society existing where the people and the government maintain an optimal state of equilibrium, but takes care not to criticize or admire one political system too closely–partly, perhaps, to avoid controversy and imprisonment or exile (which didn’t work, by the way) but also to keep his arguments logical and well-formed. He always emphasizes the generalizations, exceptions, or complexities associated with particular systems (e.g. monarchy), and rarely mentions contemporary examples when Sparta or Rome will suffice.

The Social Contract was published in 1762, and Rousseau passed away in 1778. His ideas were purportedly influential in the 1789 French Revolution (although the majority of the participants were illiterate), and it is typical to wonder what Rousseau would have thought of the execution of King Louis XVI, the formation of the National Assembly, and the rise of Maximilien Robespierre (himself an ardent supporter of Rousseau’s theories). During this year’s turbulent political season in the United States, I find myself wondering if Rousseau (who most of the Founding Fathers undoubtedly read) would have endorsed the system Americans have been so proud of.

His most lasting work  was published fourteen years before the United States Declaration of Independence was ratified, and he died nine years before the Constitution was adopted by the Convention, but nevertheless The Social Contract addressed many issues that The Federalist Papers would grapple with. Here is a passage on factionalism:

But when factions arise, and partial associations are formed at the expense of the great association, the will of each of these associations becomes general in relation to its members, while it remains particular in relation to the State: it may then be said that there are no longer as many votes as there are men, but only as many as there are associations. The differences become less numerous and give a less general result. Lastly, when one of these associations is so great as to prevail over all the rest, the result is no longer a sum of small differences, but a single difference; in this case there is no longer a general will, and the opinion which prevails is purely particular. It is therefore essential, if the general will is to be able to express itself, that there should be no partial society within the State, and that each citizen should think only his own thoughts … But if there are partial societies, it is best to have as many as possible and to prevent them from being unequal … These precautions are the only ones that can guarantee that the general will shall be always enlightened, and that the people shall in no way deceive itself.

Rousseau, Jean Jacques (2010-12-29). The Social Contract (pp. 23-24). Kindle Edition.

The general will (the interests of the group as a whole), according to Rousseau, is more important to a nation than the particular will, which is governed by individuals and their personal preferences. The passage above, then, cautions against a few powerful factions –such as political parties–as being too easily subjugated to particular wills that can deceive the people into wanting the wrong things for themselves. Thus, Rousseau would probably have been quite averse to a political system dominated by two or three enormous parties, or factions.

What about our system of representatives and senators, though? Could these political bodies, in Rousseau’s eyes, ameliorate the effects of factionalism? In my next post I’ll talk a bit about the Enlightenment philosopher’s opinions on representation and republics.